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Abstract 
This research examines the nature of relationships that 
exist between corporate governance mechanisms (board 
composition, audit committee, board size and corporate 
governance disclosure) and financial performance (return 
on equity, profit margin and return on asset) in the 
Nigerian oil and gas industry. Secondary data from the 
audited financial statements of the fifteen listed oil and gas 
companies in Nigeria were employed. The test of 
hypotheses and other analysis of data were done using 
Pearson Correlation and regression analysis generated 
from SPSS, version 17. Findings from the study revealed 
that insignificant but positive relationship does exist 
between board composition and the performance of oil 
and gas companies in Nigeria. Evidence also exist that 
corporate governance disclosure level has a positive and 
significant impact on the ROE. This study therefore 
suggests that board of directors and stakeholders of oil 
and gas companies in Nigeria should pay more attention 
towards enhancing the independence of their audit 
committees and the extent of their corporate governance 
disclosure in order to enhance their level of profitability. 
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1.0 Introduction 
There has been an upsurge in quest for good corporate governance among companies in 
various nations for excess of a decade. Corporate governance has assumed a significant 
position in driving firm’s value creation and improving financial performance especially 
in the face of consistent corporate scandals that have continued to rock corporate entities 
globally  (Korac-Kakabadse et al 2001, Shivdasani and Zenner, 2002,  Rose, 2005  as cited 
by Lawal , 2012). Various theoretical and empirical studies have been occasioned by 
corporate governance failures both at local and international level yet daily occurrence of 
financial scandals are on the increase. According to Egwuonwa,(1997),  
Corporate governance refers to the control of corporate policy through the 
power legally vested in a group or groups of people to chart a course of 
action to be followed by the organization in areas of fundamental 
importance to its survival, prosperity and proper functioning. It 
encompasses the mode of structure, the power that determines the rights 
and responsibilities of the various groups involved in running the 
organization, the legitimate expectation of the business, the method of 
operating and the overall accountability of management and of the 
directors. 
No doubt the fall of Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing and Rank Xerox in USA, Parmalat 
in Italy, the Maxwell saga in the UK, Daewoo in Korea, Leisurenet and Regal Bank in South 
Africa are all pointers to the enormous cost of corporate governance failure.  It is worthy 
of note that Nigeria is not immune to this challenge of corporate governance failure as 
various cases of financial scandal governance are increasingly being recorded and 
published on daily basis. The cases of Cadbury Nigeria Plc, Oceanic bank Plc, 
Intercontinental bank Plc, Union bank of Nigeria, Afribank, just to mention a few are part 
of Nigeria’s share of corporate governance failures.  
In response to these corporate scandals, countries and agencies around the world began 
to introduce a series of legislations and guidelines otherwise known as the codes of best 
practices. These guidelines are a set of norms that regulates the behavior and structure of 
the corporate board in exercising their monitoring and supervisory roles. Some of the 
existing codes across the globe include amongst others: UK Cadbury Code, (1992), South 
Africa King Report (1994), The Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OCED) Principles of Corporate Governance (2004), Russian CG Code, 
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(2002); Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) code of corporate governance (2003), 
US Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Code (2006), National 
Insurance Commission (NAICOM) Code (2009), Pension Commission (PENCOM) Code 
(2008).  
In Nigeria, though several efforts have been directed at curbing the menace of corporate 
governance failure as shown above, they are however largely limited to listed financial 
institutions and other non-oil sector thereby excluding insights into the behavior of 
quoted oil and gas companies in Nigeria. This shortfall is what triggers this study. 
A lot of work has been done to examine the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance across the globe but sadly, little has been done in Nigeria Oil and 
Gas industry despite the prevalent financial scandals which have their roots in corporate 
governance failures. Despite the fact that most of the world oil and gas are produced in 
the third-world countries, the industry is still far more exposed to the risk of corruption 
than other kinds of business. Nigeria which is Africa’s biggest oil producer and a host 
country for western oil majors such as Shell, Total, Mobil and ENI was ranked 144 out of 
177 in corruption index (Transparency International corruption perception index, 2013). 
Complementarily, Chazan, (2012), noted that Oil and gas sector has the highest bribery 
rate in Nigeria. Thus, primary objective of this research is to explore the relationship 
between corporate governance and the financial performance of Nigerian oil and gas 
sector. The rest of this paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 highlights the review 
of related literature and hypotheses. Overview of the Nigerian Oil & Gas Industry is the 
concern of section 3. Section 4 is devoted to the research method and analytical 
procedures. Finally, section 5 focused on the research findings and conclusions 
2.0 Literature Review  
According to Cheffins (2011), the term of corporate governance first came to light in the 
1970s in the United States. However, with the collapse of Enron and world.com, corporate 
governance has become increasingly important. International organizations such as 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and The International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) have shown interests in the adoption of corporate governance 
principles as yardstick in countries’ assessment and standard settings. 
Undoubtedly, the integrity of financial reporting will largely dependent on the conduct of 
the parties that make up the corporate governance structure. Dar, Naseem, Rehman and 
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Niazi (2011) listed the parties involved in corporate governance to include: board of 
directors, shareholders, audit committee, chief executive officer and management.   
Azeem, Hassan and Kouser (2013) studied the impact of quality corporate governance on 
firm performance by using fixed effects estimation method of panel data of 50 largest (by 
market capitalization) companies listed at Karachi Stock Exchange (Pakistan) for a ten 
year perspective. The result showed that quality of corporate governance significantly 
determines firm performance. It is therefore believed that better corporate governance 
should lead to healthier corporate performance by ensuring better decision-making. In 
expectation of such an improvement, the firm’s value should respond simultaneously to 
information indicating better corporate governance. This is in conformity with the view 
by Obiyo (2011) and Adeusi et al. (2013). 
Recent studies on these issues are Uwuigbe, (2013), Adeusi, et al. (2013), Duke and 
Kankpang (2011), Uadiale (2010), Babatunde and Olaniran (2009), Obiyo (2011), and 
Adegoke (2013). Even though some of these researchers picked one or two listed oil and 
gas companies in their samples, the results cannot be generalized to have empirically 
demonstrated how oil and gas companies in Nigeria will response to the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance. Below are the tabular 
presentation of some studies that have been conducted to establish connectivity between 
corporate governance mechanisms and the performance of firms. As compiled by the 
researchers: 
Table 1.0:  Some previous studies of corporate governance and firm performance  
 
Author(s) 
 
Industry 
Performance 
Measurement 
variables 
Corporate 
Governance 
Mechanisms 
Methods of 
Analysis 
Research Findings 
Ravivathani, T. 
(2013) 
Financial 
institution 
ROA and ROE 
Board size, board 
composition and 
audit committee 
Correlation 
and simple 
linear 
regression 
model 
*Board size, board composition are 
not significantly correlated with 
ROE and ROA 
*Audit committee and ROE are 
significantly related. 
* No significant relationship 
between audit committee and ROA  
Dar, L.A., 
Naseem, M. 
A., Rehman, 
R.U., & Niazi, 
G.S. (2001). 
Oil and gas ROE, PM 
Board size, 
chief executive 
status, annual 
general meeting 
and audit 
committee 
T-test and 
multiple 
regression 
analysis 
*significant effect and positive 
relationship between ROE, board 
size and annual general meeting 
* ROE has significant negative 
relationship with audit committee 
and CEO status 
* Positive insignificant relationship 
between PM, board size and annual 
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Author(s) 
 
Industry 
Performance 
Measurement 
variables 
Corporate 
Governance 
Mechanisms 
Methods of 
Analysis 
Research Findings 
general meeting * CEO status and 
audit committee have a significant 
negative relationship with PM 
 
Adeusi, S. O., 
Akeke, N. I., 
Aribaba, F.O., 
& Adebisi, 
O.S. (2013) 
Financial 
institution 
ROA 
Board size, board 
composition 
Multiple 
regression 
A need for increase in board size 
and decrease in board composition 
in order to increase the bank 
performance 
Yasser, Q. R., 
Entebang, H., 
& Mansor, S. 
A. (2011). 
30 
companies 
on 
Karachi 
Stock 
Exchange 
covering all 
sectors 
ROA & PM 
Board size, board 
composition and 
audit committee, 
CEO/chairman 
duality 
Multiple 
regression 
Board size should be limited to a 
sizeable limit and board must be a 
right mixture of executive and non-
executive directors 
Younas, Z. I., 
Mahmood, 
H., & Saeed, 
A. (2011). 
50 
companies 
on 
Karachi 
Stock 
Exchange 
covering all 
sectors 
ROA, debt ratio 
 
Board size, CEO–
chairman 
combined structure 
and audit 
expenditure 
Multivariate 
OLS 
regression 
models 
Prior year firm’s performance has 
positive relationship with board 
size but negative relationship with 
audit expenditure. Furthermore, 
any change in prior year firm’s 
performance causes change in CEO 
duality. 
Yasser, Q. R., & Al 
Mamun, A. 
(2012). 
Five year 
data of 
listed 
companies 
in Pakistan 
Market-based 
Tobin Q, 
accounting-
based ROA and 
economic value 
added 
Duality, board Size, 
supervisory 
directors, outside 
independent 
directors, inside 
directors 
Regression 
model 
The results indicated that 
independent variables have no 
effect on firm’s performance in 
terms of Tobin Q, ROA and EVA. 
When using Tobin Q, ROA and EVA 
as outcome variables, the results 
indicated that duality has no 
influence on firm’s performance; 
supervisory directors, outside 
independent directors and inside 
directors also have no significant 
effect on firm’s performance; board 
size and financial leverage have 
positive effect on firm’s 
performance 
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Author(s) 
 
Industry 
Performance 
Measurement 
variables 
Corporate 
Governance 
Mechanisms 
Methods of 
Analysis 
Research Findings 
Chaghadari, M. F. 
(2011). 
selected 
sample of 
companies 
listed on 
Bursa 
Malaysia 
Return on 
equity and 
return on asset 
Board 
independency, CEO 
duality, ownership 
Structure and 
board size. 
Linear 
multiple 
regression 
There is no significant relationship 
between board independency, 
board size and ownership structure 
as independent variables and firm 
performance as dependent 
variable. 
Moscu, R. (2013). 
Companies 
quoted on 
Bucharest 
Stock 
Exchange 
Debt to equity 
ratio 
Board size and 
board composition 
Linear 
multiple 
regression 
i) Board size has a positive 
relationship with firm performance, 
ii) there is a negative association 
between non-executives directors 
and firm performance, iii) there is a 
positive and significant association 
between firm performance and 
dummy which take value 1 when 
the percentage executives on the 
board is more than non-executives 
percentage 
Duke II, J., & 
Kankpang, K. 
(2011) 
40 
companies 
on 
Nigerian  
Stock 
Exchange 
covering all 
sectors 
ROA & PM 
Board Size, board 
chair/chief 
executive status, 
reliability of 
financial reporting, 
audit committee, 
code of corporate 
governance 
Least 
squares 
regression 
Strong relationships were found 
between a number of corporate 
Governance variables and firm 
performance measures. The study 
also found that there were no 
material differences between the 
reliability of financial reporting 
between quoted and unquoted 
firms. 
Uwuigbe, O.R. 
(2013) 
30 
companies 
listed on the 
Nigerian 
Stock 
Exchange 
Share prices 
over a three-
year period 
Ownership 
structure and the 
audit committee 
Regression 
and 
correlation 
analysis 
The empirical findings suggest that 
ownership structure have a 
negative association with share 
price, whereas the audit committee 
is positively related to share price 
Source: Compiled by researcher  
As evidenced from the above table, no study was exclusively focused on the oil and gas 
sector. This gap the researcher intends to fill by this study. To this end, the following 
hypotheses are considered relevant: 
 
1. H0: The relationship between board composition and financial performance of 
listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria is not statistically significant. 
 
2. H0: There is no relationship between corporate governance disclosure and 
financial performance of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria. 
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3.0 Overview of the Nigerian Oil & Gas Industry 
Nigeria is the largest oil producing country in Africa and holds the largest natural gas 
reserves in Africa. The Nigerian economy is highly dependent on the production and 
export of its oil and gas resources with Nigeria’s oil sector accounting for 95% of its export 
earnings and about 75% of the Nigerian government’s revenue. Presently, Nigerian oil 
reserves stand at about 37.1 billion barrels, the 9th largest oil reserves in the world while 
the country's gas reserves are estimated at about 182 Tcf. Overall, the oil sector 
contributed 14.4% to GDP for 2013, lower than the 15.9% recorded in 2012. These 
figures, together with associated figures relating to gas production, resulted in a decline 
in real terms in 2013 compared with 2012. 
Oil was first discovered in Nigeria in 1956 at Oloibiri in the Niger Delta region by Shell-BP 
(the then sole concessionaire) following about 50 years of exploration. Production 
commenced in 1958 at about 5,000 bpd. The foremost offshore oil discovery was also 
made by SPDC in 1965 within the shallow waters, south east of Warri. Shortly after, other 
international oil companies such as Elf, Agip, Total, Mobil and Chevron commenced 
operations in Nigeria. 
Nigeria became a member of the Organization for the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) in 1971, and established the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) in 
1977 by Decree 33. Being a member of OPEC, Nigeria is subject to the organization’s 
production quota. Oil production grew to approximately 2MMbpd in the early 70s before 
declining in the early 80s to 1.24MMbpd. This was precipitated by the fall in global oil 
demand following the oil price increase in 1979 and the ensuing global economic 
recession. By the 90s, oil production had picked up and steadied at a range of 2MMbpd to 
2.4MMbpd, at a time when oil prices were approximately US$20/bbl.   
Civil unrest in the Niger Delta region, coupled with poor capital infrastructure investment 
in production facilities inhibited growth in oil production. In the recent past the industry 
has benefited immensely from the continued upsurge in world crude oil demand which 
has kept prices at high levels. The average daily production as at 31 December 2012 and 
December 31, 2013 were 2.21MMbpd and 2.23MMbpd respectively. 
The majority of Nigeria’s oil production comes from onshore fields. However, in recent 
times, there has been significant production coming from the shallow water and deep 
water areas from projects such as Total’s 180Mbpd Usan field, which was commissioned 
in February 2012. According to NNPC, joint venture arrangements accounted for 49.89% 
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of Nigeria’s total crude oil production in 2013. PSC and service contract arrangements 
(which are more common in Nigeria’s deep offshore acreage) accounted for 39.22% and 
0.40% of the country’s 2013 crude oil production respectively, whilst independents/sole 
risk and marginal field operators (which include Nigerian companies) accounted for 
10.49% of total production in 2013. 
In 2011, the US was the largest importer of Nigerian crude oil accounting for 33.0% of 
Nigeria’s oil production. However, more recently, the US gradually imported less from 
Nigeria following its discovery of shale. In June 2014, the FG announced that the US has 
stopped the importation of Nigerian crude oil, and India had taken over as the major buyer 
of Nigerian crude oil. Other major buyers of Nigerian crude oil are Brazil (7.7%) and the 
Netherlands (7.1%). Nigeria’s export blends are light, sweet crude oils, with gravities 
ranging from API 29 - 47 and low sulphur contents of 0.05% - 0.3%. These characteristics 
allow Nigerian crude oil to trade at a premium to Brent, the North Sea benchmark for 
crude oil. 
Figure 1: Overview of the Nigerian Oil & Gas Industry 
 
 
Source: http://www.cliqenergy.com/faq_sheets.php 
 
The Niger Delta region has had a history of civil unrest, caused by host community 
agitation in the face of perceived environmental degradation by the International Oil 
Companies (IOCs). This has led to severe interruptions of petroleum operations by local 
militants. Significant efforts have been made by the Government to tackle the problems 
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in the Niger Delta. For example, the Niger Delta Development Commission was 
established to, amongst other things: 
1. Develop the infrastructural needs of the Niger Delta region 
2. Manage the sums received from upstream oil companies and the allocation of the 
Federation Account for tackling ecological problems which arise from the 
exploration of oil minerals in the Niger Delta area and 
3. Alleviate the plight of local inhabitants. 
In addition, in 2009, the Government implemented an amnesty program, which has been 
highly successful in reducing militancy. As a result of this, the oil industry has gradually 
recovered from the disruptions. Most of the onshore fields in the country that were shut 
down due to a lack of security (including the Bonga and Escravos fields of Royal Dutch 
Shell and Chevron Texaco) have been reopened. 
Despite this, the oil sector has suffered from significant disruptions in 2011/12 due to 
the leakages, which caused the temporary shutdown of facilities such as Bonga, a 200,000 
barrel per day (bpd) facility, which supplies nearly 10 percent of Nigeria's total crude 
output. Leakages on the Trans Forcados Pipeline (which is a major supplier to various 
power stations across the Niger Delta region) also resulted in SPDC declaring a force 
majeure on its Forcados export program (which has a production capacity of 400,000 
bpd) during the fourth quarter of 2011. 
Africa’s proven oil reserves are currently in excess of 128 billion barrels, representing 8% 
of the world’s proven oil reserves. This is an increase from 123 billion barrels in 2009; a 
trend which we expect to continuously see in coming years. Despite Africa being home to 
8% of the world’s proven oil reserves; the continent produces 12% of the world’s supply. 
Figure 2: Proven Oil Reserves - Africa (2013),  
 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2014 
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Various new opportunities still exist in Africa. This is evident from the licensing of only 
45% of the 4,200 oil and gas blocks available and the emergence of East African countries 
such as Tanzania and Mozambique as new industry players. A classic example of the 
developments in Africa is the production of the Jubilee Field located in Ghana which took 
a remarkable 24 months from development to production. It is hailed as the fastest 
deepwater development ever, producing 95,000 bpd and demonstrating to the world the 
possibilities in Africa. 
There are a number of challenges facing the Nigerian oil and gas industry which are 
constraining the industry’s growth. Notable among the challenges faced are: 
i. Poor l infrastructure 
i. Corruption 
ii. Uncertain legal and regulatory framework 
iii. Set-up costs 
iv. Access to funding 
v. Political influences 
vi. Uncertainty and delays in passing laws 
vii. Security and host community management. 
The petroleum industry in Nigeria is regulated by the following acts and agencies:  
a) Ministry of Petroleum Resources  
b) Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC)  
c) Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR)  
d) National Petroleum Investment Management Services (NAPIMS)  
e) Nigeria Content Development and Monitoring Board (NCMB)  
f) Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)  
g) Oil and Gas Policy Commission  
h) The Petroleum Act 1969  
i) The Petroleum Profit Tax 1958  
j) The Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contracts Act No. 9 of 
1999 (as amended)  
k) The Associated Gas Re-injection Act 1979   
l) Public Procurement Act 2007  
m) Central Bank of Nigeria Act 2007  
n) Nigeria Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI) Act 2007  
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o) Nigeria Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act 2010  
p) Sovereign Wealth Funds Act 2011/Nigeria Sovereign Investment Act 2011  
q) The Petroleum Industry Bill 2012  
4.0 Research Method and Analytical Procedures 
This research (as earlier enunciated) investigates the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial performance of listed oil and gas companies on the Nigerian 
stock and Exchange. Studies that establish causal relationships between variables may be 
termed explanatory studies (Saunders et al.2007 as cited in Adeyemi, & Fagbemi, 2010).   
Population, Sample and Sampling Technique 
The research population to serve the purpose of this study is the fifteen listed oil and gas 
companies listed and active on the floor of the Nigerian Stock Exchange.  The ultimate test 
of a sample design is how well it represents the characteristics of the entire population 
(Emory & Cooper, 2003 as cited in Adeyemi, & Fagbemi, 2010).  In order to achieve this, 
the entire 15 listed oil and gas companies in Nigerian were considered. The period 
between 2011 and 2012 financial years for the fifteen companies were chosen as our 
sample and technique is purposive. 
The model specification: 
Y= ƒ (a+β1(BCOM) + β2(AUDCOM) + β3(BSIZE) + β4(CGDI) + ε) ----------------- (i) 
Where: Y= firm performance (ROE, PM and ROA) 
BCOM= Board Composition (proportion of representation of non-executive directors on 
board).  AUDCOM= Audit Committee (proportion of audit committee outside to total audit 
committee) BSIZE= Board Size (total number of the directors on board). 
CGDI= Corporate Governance Disclosure Index (total score per company/maximum 
score) x100. 
From equation (i), three equations were derived emerged for this study: 
ROE= a+β1(BCOM) + β2(AUDCOM) + β3(BSIZE) + β4(CGDI) + ε--------------------1 
PM= a+β1(BCOM) + β2(AUDCOM) + β3(BSIZE) + β4(CGDI) + ε----------------------2 
ROA= a+β1(BCOM) + β2(AUDCOM) + β3(BSIZE) + β4(CGDI) + ε--------------------3 
Where: ROE= Return on Equity (profit after tax/shareholders’ fund) 
 PM= Profit Margin (profit after tax/turnover) 
 ROA=Return on Assets (profit after tax/total assets) 
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Table 2:  Level of Corporate Governance Disclosure     
S/N 
CODE FOR LISTED 
OIL & GAS 
COMPANIES IN 
NIGERIA 
SECTOR 
YEAR YEAR 
TOTAL AVERAGE CGDI 
CGD 2012 CGD 2011 
1 OAO Oil & Gas 25 21 46 23.000 1.533 
2 CAO Oil & Gas 14 14 28 14.000 0.467 
3 CON Oil & Gas 23 20 43 21.500 0.717 
4 ETE Oil & Gas 21 21 42 21.000 0.700 
5 FOR Oil & Gas 20 20 40 20.000 0.667 
6 JOM Oil & Gas 22 22 44 22.000 0.733 
7 MON Oil & Gas 29 29 58 29.000 0.967 
8 MRS Oil & Gas 20 20 40 20.000 0.667 
9 SEP Oil & Gas 21 21 42 21.000 0.700 
10 TON Oil & Gas 29 29 58 29.000 0.967 
11 AFR Oil & Gas 28 28 56 28.000 0.933 
12 NAV Oil & Gas 8 10 18 9.000 0.300 
13 ANI Oil & Gas 15 12 27 13.500 0.450 
14 BEC Oil & Gas 11 7 18 9.000 0.300 
15 RUP Oil & Gas 14 10 24 12.000 0.400 
Source: computed by researcher using data extracted from annual reports and websites of listed oil and gas 
companies in Nigeria (2014) 
Table 2, revealed that all the observed oil and gas companies presented a statement of 
their corporate governance practice. However, the extensiveness of the disclosure varies 
between companies. Based on the 30 governance indices used for assessment, Mobil Oil 
Nigeria Plc, and Total Nigeria plc emerged with highest number of corporate governance 
disclosure with 29 disclosure items i.e. (97%). On the other hand, BECO Petroleum 
Product Plc and Navitus Energy Plc disclosed the least governance items with 30% level 
of disclosure.  
5.0 Findings and Conclusions 
From the above regression Table 3 below, the coefficient of determination R2 revealed 
that the explanatory variables accounted for 43% of change in ROE, 39.9% of change in 
PM and just 6.1% of changes in ROA.  
Table 3: Regression Coefficient for Model 1- 3 
  ROE= a+β1(BCOM) +β2(AUDCOM) +β3(BSIZE) +β4(CGDI) + ε ……… Model 1 
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Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper Bound 
1 1  (Constant) -49.995 25.770  -1.940 .064 -103.069 3.079 
      BCOM 28.479 28.217 .168 1.009 .323 -29.636 86.593 
     AUDCOM 73.235 30.838 .367 2.375 .026 9.722 136.748 
      BSIZE -2.756 1.379 -.345 -1.998 .057 -5.597 .085 
      CGDI 48.358 16.053 .554 3.012 .006 15.297 81.419 
  R      0.657 
  R Square                                                                               0.431 
  Adjusted R Square    0.340 
   F-Statistics                    4.738  0.006 sig 
 
 PM= a+β1(BCOM) +β2(AUDCOM) +β3(BSIZE) +β4(CGDI) + ε ………… Model 2 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval 
for B 
B Std. Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
2 (Constant) -17.859 8.460  -2.111 .045 -35.283 -.435 
BCOM 2.219 9.264 .041 .240 .813 -16.860 21.298 
AUDCOM 39.113 10.124 .614 3.863 .001 18.262 59.964 
BSIZE .068 .453 .027 .150 .882 -.865 1.001 
CGDI 1.583 5.270 .057 .300 .766 -9.271 12.437 
  R               0.632 
  R Square              0.399 
  Adjusted R Square                                                                0.303 
  F-Statistics              4.151     0.010 sig 
  ROA= a+β1(BCOM) +β2(AUDCOM) +β3(BSIZE) +β4(CGDI) + ε   …… Model 3 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 2/4 (2016) 155-171 
168 
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
95% Confidence Interval for B 
B Std. Error Beta 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper Bound 
3 (Constant) -5.363 18.383  -.292 .773 -43.224 32.498 
BCOM 16.851 20.129 .179 .837 .410 -24.605 58.308 
AUDCOM 12.236 21.999 .111 .556 .583 -33.071 57.544 
BSIZE -.274 .984 -.062 -.279 .783 -2.301 1.752 
CGDI -4.233 11.451 -.087 -.370 .715 -27.817 19.352 
R                      0.247 
R Square                      0.061 
Adjusted R Square                    -0.089 
F-Statistics       0.406   0.803 not sig 
Source: computed by researcher using data extracted from annual reports of observed companies (2014) 
 
Unlike other sectors like banking, the coefficient of determination R2  is a clear indication 
that changes in the profitability level of the oil and gas companies is majorly a function of 
changes in other external factors, which may include: global price of  crude oil, OPEC 
decisions, world trade flexibility, global insecurity , operational risks, government 
decisions, technical know- how, fund availability, problems from  host communities, 
vandalization of assets, kidnapping, court litigations, penalties and  political issues  among 
others  and not necessarily the composition of board of directors, board size, audit 
committee or level of corporate governance disclosure. 
Conclusions 
Based on the outcomes of our analysis from Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 in Table 3 
above, we concluded that board composition has a positive relationship with financial 
performance of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria even though the relationship is not 
significant. Since the results support our hypothesis 1, we therefore accept the null 
hypothesis that board composition does not have a significant relationship with financial 
performance of listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria.  
The work of Kajola, (2008) and Adeusi, et al. (2013) support our finding. 
 
With regards to hypothesis 2, we conclude from table 3 above, that there exists at positive 
relationship between corporate governance disclosure and ROA. For PM, the effect of 
corporate governance is positive though not significant and a negative relationship with 
Journal of Accounting, Finance and Auditing Studies 2/4 (2016) 155-171 
169 
 
ROA. It therefore means that ROE and PM are likely going to increase if companies disclose 
their corporate governance policies and principles. 
Based on the foregoing outcomes, we reject the null hypothesis which states that there is 
no relationship between corporate governance disclosure and financial performance of 
listed oil and gas companies in Nigeria. The outcome is in line with the study of 
(Danoshana & Ravivathani, (2013), Gurbuz, et al. (2010)). 
 Recommendations 
Stakeholders in the Nigerian oil and gas industry can leverage on corporate governance 
as a vital instrument for increasing profitability by taking the following recommendations 
into cognizance: 
i) Efforts to ensure strong, effective and independent audit committee should be 
harnessed by the board of directors and shareholders to drive corporate 
governance policies and practice equivalent to global standard. 
ii) Company’s objectives and the processes in place for achieving the objectives 
should have their roots in established corporate governance framework to drive 
compliance, penalties for non-compliance.  An effective legal framework should be 
developed to specify the rights and obligations of company, the directors, 
shareholders, specific disclosure requirements and provisions for the enforcement 
of compliance with codes of corporate governance.   
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